This paper analyses the causes of banking crises by the way of a historical comparative casestudy. Moreover, the analysis draws on theories elaborated by the economist Hyman Minsky.
Introduction
The deep global financial and economic crisis triggered by the US subprime crisis in [2007] [2008] has given renewed interest in research on financial crises, both their causes and their effects. This paper will focus on systemic banking crises. Depending on definition, more than 120 systemic banking crises and about 50 minor, non-systemic crises, have been identified over the period from 1980 to 2007. 1 This is in contrast with the period 1945 to 1980 over which the number of reported crises is few. Even the financial crises of the inter-war years and the recurring financial crises of the 19 th century capitalism contrast the stability characterizing the period from the 1940s to the mid-1970s. This might indicate that financial instability and crises is an inherent feature of capitalist economies, whereas the frequency of crises varies with forms of capitalist economies. The large number of systemic crises after 1980 also points to deep structural changes in the global economy during this period.
It has been argued that for economic historians, the most policy relevant implication of the recent crisis is the extent to which it has affected earlier wisdoms regarding what ought to be done to deal with major crises. Given the huge sovereign debt crisis in Europe, this topic should be of great interest for research. In order to learn, however, how to handle financial crises, it is necessary to deepen our understanding of the causes of financial crises. When doing this, it is also important to realise and emphasise the fact that there is no scholarly consensus upon the causation of financial crises. Neither is there consensus on how a crisis should be handled when it unfolds, and particularly there is no consensus of what should be done during the aftermath of a crisis. Furthermore, there is no consensus on how to define a financial crisis.
Hence, it is essential to clarify initially what we mean by the term financial crisis. A financial crisis occurs as a result of financial assets and thus the value of financial institutions is reduced significantly in a relatively short period of time, and the drop in asset prices is typically considerably worse than an ordinary correction. The systemic risk is so large that the failure of a single financial intermediary can ramify through the financial system in such a way that negative market psychology makes the financial markets work irrational by not allocating credit in a normal way. 2 There are many types of incidents that relate to this process. Firstly, we have different manifestations of banking crises. Secondly, we have other types of events that may be 1 Laeven og Valencia (2008: 3 ff) 2 Eichengreen and Portes (1987) 2 categorized as financial crises, such as currency crises, sovereign debt crises, and crashes in asset markets. Often, these different manifestations of financial crises, link up in sequences where one crisis causes another.
Among all these manifestations of financial instability, banking crises are the most serious type of crisis in the financial system. This is because banks are key players in the payment system, and if this is adversely affected by a banking crisis, the consequences can be disastrous for the real economy. Furthermore, a systemic banking crisis might block the credit lines to both non financial businesses as well as to other financial institutions to such an extent that investments plummet -at worst, dramatically and consequently pushes the economy into depression by the way of a credit crunch.
A systemic banking crisis can be defined as financial disturbances to the whole banking system leading to significant loss of banking capital, caused by loan losses, nonperforming loans and other financial assets' loss of value. A system-wide banking crisis may also manifest itself as a depositor-run on banks and result in a bank panic. The fundamental problem, however, is loan losses. If borrowers do not have problems with paying back their loans, the probability of a banking crisis is certainly very small.
The purpose of this paper is to describe and analyse the causes of banking crises. Hence, the basic research question is: Which causal factors can be identified as crucial for building up of financial imbalances to such an extent that they trigger a banking crisis? The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section I provides a theoretical and conceptual framework, whilst section II discusses the recent American crisis. Section III explores the Norwegian banking crisis [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] , and section IV compares the two banking crises. Section V concludes.
I. Analytical framework
The paper compares two historical cases comprising the recent American subprime-and credit crisis, and the massive Norwegian banking crisis [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] . This comparative case study strategy chosen allows us to control for variation in context. Moreover, the comparative strategy applied here is to pick cases that are quite different -the "most different systems" approach as it is denoted in the case-study literature -originally called "the method of agreement" by John Stuart Mill. The logic is that you select two (or more) cases that have the same dependent variable in common -here systemic financial crises. The cases differ, however, on a range of variables. But if you find common critical variables in both -or all -the cases, they can be regarded as independent variables. If we find common patterns across such strongly differing cases, this may strengthen the idea that we are dealing with general relationships.
The recent U.S. credit crisis and the Norwegian banking crisis of the late 1980s-early 1990s are good cases to conduct such a comparison. USA and Norway are both capitalist economies, but differs substantially in how their economies are institutionalized, are organized and work. Norway is a small country with a very open economy. Export and import makes up for a very large portion of GDP. Total foreign trade's share of GDP was about 75 percent during the 1980s and 1990s, varying with oil prices. The USA, in contrast, is the world largest national economy. However foreign trade's share of the U.S. GDP is about 30 percent and thus less than half of Norway's. Both are among the richest countries in the world measured as GDP per capita, but income inequality is far larger in the U.S. than in Norway. The business systems also differ substantially, being more competitive oriented in the US. and more co-ordinated in Norway, featuring a combination of free market activity and government intervention, including a widespread government ownership in key areas and the largest companies. This business system differences are even reflected in employer-labour relations system. Norway is, in contrast to the US case, characterized by strong collaborative aspects. This is demonstrated by the fact that 52 percent of the Norwegian workforce is organized in trade-unions, whilst this applies to less than 8 percent of the American work force. An extensive system of welfare capitalism characterizes the Norwegian society, whilst the U.S. welfare is to a much larger extent built on insurance and far more adhere to the principle "you are your own fortune." The business structure also varies considerably. Although both are democracies, both political institutions as well as the economic institutions of capitalism also vary largely. Although there has been a convergence on some of these differing societal traits over time, most of them still exist.
Minsky's Financial Instability Hypothesis
Theoretically, this paper is based on Hyman Minsky's "Financial instability hypothesis" and C.P.
Kindleberger's interpretation of his theory and application on historical material. 3 Some economists have made objections to Minsky's framework arguing that his approach "cannot be 3 Minsky (1975; 1986; 1992) 4 modelled"; his analysis "is not rigorous enough" etc. On this point I will simply adhere to Charles Goodhart's comment:
"One of the problems that we have had in macro is that a bad but rigorous model tends to beat a correct but literary exposition in peer esteem in economics. What I would regard as a correct but literary exposition in economics is the work of Hyman Minsky." 4 Or in other words: I prefer an analytical framework which is almost correct instead of an alternative one that is precisely wrong.
According to Minsky, capitalism and especially the financial system is fundamentally unstable. Instability is intrinsic to a dynamic capitalist system because a capitalist economy is profit-seeking and driven by innovation -incremental as well as radical ones, hence the necessity to transgress the conventional idea that "free markets" promote stability. He developed his argument on this point over a long period of time until his ideas was published in more or less finished form in 1986 in his book Stabilizing an Unstable Economy.
5 This view of capitalist market economies is antithetical to mainstream economic theory's raison d'être, which is stability: stable process, stable employment and financial stability.
Moreover, Minsky held the view that feasible theory is institution-specific and that the institutions of capitalism have to be brought into the analysis at the outset. Minsky also argues that capitalism comes in many forms and states that "...Nowhere is this dynamism more evident than in its financial structure..." 6 Minsky explicitly "endogenized" the forces that trigger the sequence of a boom-bust cycle. In brief Minsky's thesis is that every business cycle in a capitalist economy is running through a development with growing optimism about the possibility to realise profit opportunities. This is conducive to instability-enhancing a type of behaviour over the course of the cycle that leads to the development of speculative euphoria and accumulation of debt, leading to increased fragility. In line with Minsky, I argue that the two crises compared in the paper were not primarily a result of some external shock to the economy, but rather brought about by forces internal to the capitalist economy.
Minsky's theory is not explicitly historical even though it is based on an analysis of Kindleberger's description and analysis of "disequilibrium processes" like boom-bust sequences in history. 8 
Minsky cycles
In Minsky's financial analysis, the unit of observation -the behavioural entity -is the firm.
Minsky argued that three distinct income-debt relations for economic units can be identified.
Over the business cycle, these financial positions typically develop from "hedge" to "speculative" and finally to "Ponzi"-finance. 9 Hedge finance is characterized by borrowers who can fulfil all of their contractual payment obligations by their cash flow. During the thriving period of a boom, however, expectations of future returns become increasingly optimistic.
Businesses in profitable sectors of the economy want to raise profits further and make increasing 7 Kindleberger (1978 Kindleberger ( /1989 8 Minsky (1992) 9 Minsky (1992: 6 ff) 6 investments financed by boosting their level of debt. 10 Speculative finance units are borrowers who can meet their interest payments, but they cannot repay the original loan out of their cash flow. Instead, they need to "roll over" their debt in order to re-finance matured debt; hence such units are dependent on well-functioning financial markets. Typical speculative units are governments with floating debts, businesses with loans that need to be re-financed at maturity and banks. Ponzi-finance signifies units that are not able to fulfil the payment of the loan, nor meet interest due on outstanding debt.
The transition from hedge and a stable situation to a speculative and fragile situation can, as abovementioned, be explained endogenously because of the profit-seeking nature of a capitalist economy. Actually, economic stability encourages increased risk-taking as well as swelling leverage, which in turn produces increasing financial instability and enlarged and deeper recessions. Thus, Minsky emphasizes that the financial instability hypothesis is a model of a capitalist economy "...which does not rely upon exogenous shocks to generate business cycles of varying severity."
11
During the business cycle and the transition from robust to fragile financial relations, financial bubbles are inflated by supply of ever-increasing bank credit or various forms of creditcreating instruments. Minsky has linked institutional innovation to profit opportunities, showing how innovation allows business activity to expand even in the absence of expansionary monetary policy. 12 Minsky also demonstrated that institutional innovations often encourage banks to seek new ways of providing finance. However, such innovations amplify the possibility for financial instability because "...every institutional innovation which results in both new ways to finance business and new substitutes for cash assets decreases the liquidity of the economy". 13 The key mechanism that pushes the economy toward a financial crisis is thus the accumulation of debt, which increases financial fragility in the business sector. On the other hand this piling up of debt becomes unmanageable for banks and other financial intermediaries since the downturn of the business cycle increases the risk for default on loans in the non-financial sector. Let us therefore also turn to Charles Kindleberger and his stage model of financial crises, a pattern he elaborated 10 Minsky (1992:7) 11 Ibid. 12 Minsky (1957) 13 (Ibid., p. 184) 7 from the diachronically comparative study of past crises. 14 His financial fragility approach regards financial crises as an essential component of the turning point of the business cycle.
15
The crisis occurs as a consequence of the 'speculative excesses' of the previous boom, characterized by indebtedness because of reckless lending and excessive borrowing during the boom. This boosts financial fragility. Hence a crisis can be triggered when the bubble bursts, primarily as a result of the downswing of the business cycle.
16
At the outset the events leading up to a crisis start with a novel offering which brings about an altered economic outlook "by changing profit opportunities in at least one important sector of the economy." 17 As a result, both business firms and individuals with savings or credit pick up the opportunity, hence investments and production rise. This stimulates an increased demand for finance. A boom is developed, fed by an expansion of credit. The extension of bank credit increases the money supply and self-exciting euphoria develops. The real value of debt decreases, which in turn encourages further borrowing. An increasing number of firms and households are tempted into speculative finance. When the number of firms and households indulging in these practices grow large, speculation for profit leads away from normal, rational behaviour and manias and subsequently irrational bubbles result. The term mania emphasizes the irrationality (mob psychology, herd behaviour) and the term bubble foreshadows the bursting.
18
Like Irving Fisher, representatives of the Business-Cycle school attach great importance to the role of debt in causing financial difficulties. This argument rests on presumptions that discriminating between good and bad credit risks is more difficult when the economy is expanding rapidly "because many borrowers are at least temporarily very profitable and liquid." 19 Increased financial fragility is also a result of "debt contracted to leverage the acquisition of speculative assets for subsequent resale." 20 In this connection, financial innovation and the creation of new instruments are of importance according to Minsky: "Like all entrepreneurs in a capitalist economy, bankers are aware that innovation assures profit. Thus, bankers (using the term generically for all intermediaries in finance), whether they 14 See, for example Kindleberger (1989 Kindleberger ( / 1978 15 Also see Fisher (1933) 16 Kindleberger (1989 Kindleberger ( / 1978 17 Ibid, p.18. 18 Kindleberger (1989 Kindleberger ( / 1978 19 Goldstein and Turner (1996:12) 20 Kindleberger (1989 Kindleberger ( / 1978 , cf. Minsky (1992) be brokers or dealers, are merchants of debt who strive to innovate in the assets they acquire and the liabilities they market."
21
Markets can fail for reasons other than a lack of information. Information can be available and transparent, but in every expansion, as Keynes explained, there is the tendency for investors to become overconfident and overlook the warning signs. The reason for this is that financial markets -as already has been indicated -are driven by market psychology like greed, fear and herd behaviour rather than rational expectations. Over periods characterized by long-lasting prosperity and over-optimism about future prospects, not only non-financial but even financial institutions are affected by euphoria. Consequently, they invest more in increasingly riskier assets and boost their leverage, seeking expected higher return. Creditors are eager to provide them with funds, since their expectations have improved as well. As a result "… leverage increases, risk premia go down and bank portfolios consist of relative riskier projects."
22
Only a small incident is needed to transform the mania into panic, which then instigates the crisis and inflicts widespread damage. The problem ramifies throughout the financial system, creating financial instability and debt deflation. Sharp swings in assets markets like real estate, equity prices and even in commodity markets, intensifies the crisis because of high loan concentration. Moreover, the asset price declines and depresses the market value of collateral.
Further difficulties arise when individuals, firms and banks have insufficient cash flow to service their liabilities, and debtors, unable to pay debts when due, may be forced by creditors to liquidate their assets. This leads to a situation with a decline in price level and demand.
Subsequently, the number of bankruptcies increases reinforcing the downturn further. Real interest rates rise with deflation and falling prices worsening the situation further. This process of debt-deflation, as Fisher termed it, continues until bankruptcies and bank losses have eliminated indebtedness.
According to Minsky the business cycles in history are "...compounded out of (i) the internal dynamics of capitalist economies, and (ii) the systems of interventions and regulations that are designed to keep the economy operating within reasonable bounds." 23 The financial imbalances, however, do not reach a high and destabilizing level in each cycle, therefore each boom do not necessary lead to a financial crisis. Whether the built up financial imbalances are 21 Minsky (1992) 22 Behattacharya et al. (2010) 23 Minsky (1992) Minsky (1992) 25 Minsky (1992) , op.cit. 26 Minsky (1991) ripening as structural relations, conventions, and institutions change. There is no automatic pilot for the economy. " 27 Minsky pointed out, that especially after Reagan and Thatcher, regulations were dismantled piece by piece at an accelerating speed, which promoted an increasingly fragile financial system featuring more riskier assets and more debt relative to income flows.
The financial fragility approach of Minsky and Kindleberger provides a helpful framework for analyzing both past and actual crises, and the following analysis will primarily draw on this framework. However, I want also to emphasize their coupling of boom-bust sequences to the business cycle and even the super-cycle. When the Western industrialized countries were unable to adapt to global structural changes and their industrial base thus shrunk after 1980, the growing financial instability made these countries ever more crisis prone.
II. The recent US financial crisis
The U. In early September, however, losses had become so large in these institutions that the U.S.
government found it necessary to bail them out by the way of an injection of capital amounting to 100 billion USD. Thus the government got a 70 percent stake.
On 14 
What caused the American credit crisis?
Defaults on subprime loans did not fundamentally cause the recent US financial crisis, but the subprime troubles definitely triggered it. The US financial crisis followed a nearly classical boom-bust pattern and unfolded through the phases described by the Kindleberger-Minsky approach. One of the basic mechanisms in this model is that speculation and credit expansion cause asset-price inflation in the asset markets -i.e. the markets for property and securities. If profit expectations are large enough, the result can be the inflation of price bubbles in these markets. Such financial bubbles increase the financial institutions' credit risk substantially.
Hence, bubbles in the asset markets constitute a major driver in building up financial imbalances that might trigger a financial crisis. A large body of research have established a link between asset market bubbles and the occurrence of financial crises. It is important, however, to have in mind how Keynes commented this in his General Theory:
"Speculators may do no harm as bubbles on a steady stream of enterprise. But the position is serious when enterprise becomes a whirlpool of speculation." Keynes (1936: 159) years...presumably for lack of new investment opportunities." 30 Moreover, this development was fundamentally caused by huge foreign funds flowing into the US helping fuel credit expansion.
All this liquidity found its way to the financial sector to be invested in financial assets. , which issued such structured products, were financed by short term Certificates etc., whilst they at the same time had a portfolio of CDOs with longer maturities. Thus they were exposed to a substantial maturity risk.
Subprime loans and the real estate bubble
39 Cf. for example (Knutsen 2008 : p 49 ff) 40 Knutsen (2008: 44) All the SIVs that operated this way were bankrupt as of October 2008, with debts amounting to USD 400 billion.
41

Dynamics behind the development of the Housing Bubble
Many factors contributed to the development of the housing bubble, hence to increased and unmanageable credit risk in the financial institutions' assets. Among the most important factors do we find interest rates, the huge influx of liquidity from foreign capital sources, credit expansion, speculation driven by optimism and market psychology (animal spirit). Formal and informal institutional changes in the shape of changed rules of the game, change in institutional structure and the introduction of new instruments have to be taken into consideration in this context. This financial liberalization gave rise to destabilization of the financial sector and was highly conducive to speculation in asset markets.
When the dot.com. bubble in the stock market collapsed in 2000, FED cut its key rate Moreover, Greenspan and the FED were worried that the low growth in prices could lead to deflation and bring the economy into a stalemate like in Japan.
The money stock (M2) fell over the period 1990-1995, but thereafter money supply grew at an annual rate of around 10 percent during the following decade. What were the sources of liquidity that made the huge credit expansion possible, which eventually inflated a housing bubble? USA developed large and mounting trade deficits, and even built up a huge public debt.
Under Bush the government deficit rose tremendously, mainly because of tax-cuts to highincome groups and astronomical costs incurred by the Iraqi war. These deficits were financed by issuing sovereign debt nationally and internationally.
Consequently, both private and public debt piled up. Global money poured into the USA from countries like China, India as well as the oil exporting countries, who bought public and private debt. China experienced an immense growth in its export of goods to the Western 41 Lybeck (2009: 73) countries, particularly the USA. This export growth accelerated mainly after China became a WTO member in 2001. Cheap Chinese goods helped push commodity prices down. This development helped to inflate asset prices, whilst American production of manufactured goods was further crowded out. A major reason for the extremely low prices on Chinese manufactured goods for global export was the very low wages made possible by the existence of a huge reserve workforce of immigrant workers from the rural areas. Furthermore, costs could be kept low because of bad working conditions, no real freedom to organize and free access for manufacturers to pass huge environmental costs to society. 42 Thus, part of the surplus accumulated in China, could be used to buy U.S. public and private debt.
Moreover, the U.S. savings rate dropped almost continuously over the decades before 1962. 1965. 1968. 1971. 1974. 1977. 1980. 1983. 1986. 1989. 1992. 1995. 1998. 2001. 2004 . 44 Reich (2007: 80) 45 The extensive financial liberalization caused changes in the institutional structure that opened a window of opportunity for the money managers to design new products and to seize a whole range of new profit opportunities. From the late 1990s, the sale of subprime mortgage loans accelerated, and in 2000 the rating agency Standard & Poor published a statement which stated that so-called "piggyback" loans were a positive and sensible product. This home financing option could typically be a package of two mortgage loans of which for example one was within 80 pct. of estimated market value, whilst the other cover the remaining 20 pct., secured by a mortgage with a different lender, and the homebuyer has zero down payment. The need for accumulated equity was thus exceeded, and made it possible to finance up to 100 pct. of the purchase of real estate by taking up loans. The usually imposes a higher interest rate on the second mortgage since the first mortgage gets paid off before the second. There was also offered subprime loans with Zero repayments as well as subprime mortgages with adjustable interest rate. Such ARMs often offered a low or even zero "teaser rate" at the outset, which after a while was adjusted upwards.
As already has been pointed out previously an important part of liberalization prior to the outbreak of the financial crises, has been the invention of new instruments and new organizational forms -i.e. financial innovations. Securitization as described earlier in the paper and the design of credit derivatives like CDOs are examples of this. However, it is very important to realize that the value of such instruments depends fundamentally on price movements and cash flow in different and underlying financial assets. The liberalization of the formal institutions already mentioned led to a veritable growth climate for financial novelties which besides the aforementioned instruments also included organizations such as hedge funds, SPVs (Special Purpose Vehicles), SIVs (Special Investment Vehicles) and so-called CDSs
(Credit Default Swaps). A CDS move credit risk and is thus a contract between two parties
where one assures the other at a premium and guarantees the insured party that he / she is paid in the event of a financial institution goes bankrupt or a financial instrument becomes worthless. In reality, this is insurance in line with standard casualty insurance. If a credit damage occurs because of bankruptcy or otherwise during the period of insurance, then the insurance company collect the total insurance premium. The huge insurance company AIG lost a vast amount of money on speculative business in CDSs. When the company assessed the risk in the CDSs they traded, they amazingly did not correlate these securities risk with the risk of default of the underlying subprime mortgages. Counterparty risk seemed to be completely forgotten. Only during 2008 AIG lost incredible USD 100 billion, the largest loss suffered by any financial institution.
50
50 Lybeck (2009: 44) 24
The Real estate bubble made a major contribution to the development of large financial imbalances in the U.S. financial sector and when the housing market collapsed, the financial crisis was set off. An argument which has been advanced to explain the house price bubble has been rising construction costs. This argument can easily be falsified because U.S. construction costs had fallen continuously relative to consumer goods prices since 1980. 51 Low interest rate policy, however, contributed to inflate the housing bubble, but was only a part of the cause.
Actually, the house prices grew already 10 per cent annually in 2000. Many informed observers were already in spring 2000 aware that it built up to a crash in the stock market, and many insiders moved their investments into the housing market. The new objects of speculation were now securities linked to the real estate market. Thus, the sharp rise in house prizes was triggered before FED started their interest rate cuts. 52 The resulting housing boom reinforced the pervasive belief that home prices could only go higher. The result was a substantial weakening of lending standards. Mortgage lenders seem to have believed that home buyers would not default, because rising prices would make keeping up with their payments very attractive.
Securitization and new instruments also contributed considerably to increased credit supply and rising home prices. These financial innovations made it possible to move mortgage loans out of the balance sheets of the Mortgage banks by the way of securitization, an operation that created the basis for further lending. It is also of importance to note that an extensive network of mortgage brokers have an important role in the U.S. system of house financing. They operate outside formal financial regulations. Since their income is based on commission of sales, they have had a strong incentive to sell mortgages, and they have not had any duty to carry out thoroughly credit rating. At the same time this accelerating securitization process created on its side the basis for a mortgage bond business involving Wall Street, other U.S. financial firms, as well as European banks. A large and increasing part of this business was leveraged. Minsky argued that during a boom, businesses in profitable areas of the economy are generously rewarded for boosting their level of debt. The more one borrows the more profit one appears to make, and with increased debt comes increased financial fragility.
51 Shiller (2008: 33) Another important institutional factor that also helped to boost up investments in residential property was the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which eliminated interest deductions on consumer and auto loans while allowing interest deductions on mortgage debt, thus making the latter a more attractive source of financing. On the demand side had facilities for subprime mortgages given strong incentives to buy the freehold properties. There were thus strong speculative tendencies underpinning the development of wide-ranging financial imbalances in the U.S. economy.
Speculation rooted in market psychological forces like herding and over-optimism about future prices was thus central to blow up the credit driven U.S. housing bubble. The reckless lending and corresponding piling up of debt as well as the fragmentation of risk built up the imbalances that finally triggered the financial crisis, which in turn caused the economic downswing to develop into a major recession. Keynes pointed out in the General Theory that expectations of future returns on investments were necessarily associated with great uncertainty, and thus withheld from rational calculation. Thus a wide scope opened up making it possible that expectations are influenced by emotions and mood waves. Liberalization opened a window of opportunity for mortgage banks, which seized the opportunity to sell subprime loans indiscriminately, using mortgage brokers. Investment banks on Wall Street took as eagerly the opportunity that opened with securitization to increase their profits significantly by facilitating and sell credit derivatives. The money managers convinced house buyers that they could safely absorb subprime mortgage loans, because house prices would continue to rise and interest rates would remain low. It seems that they believed in such visions themselves, and it appeared they all overlooked the big risk of default which such loans involved. The investment banks didn't limit themselves to act as underwriters, but did also own large holdings of CDOs, CDSs and other mortgage backed and asset backed securities. These holdings were funded by debt and increased gearing.
Contagion and irrational optimism
The boom's transition to a phase of Kindlebergerian mania is a period characterized by widespread irrational optimism, and herd mentality is now widely spread. An increasing number of non-professional investors follow the professional ones into the asset markets powered by unrealistic expectations about getting rich quickly. Mass media are often a driving force to build 26 up euphoric prospects about prices and profits by the way of launching new-era narratives, as they likewise are front-runners in spreading pessimism and visions of disaster when bubbles
burst. An idea that often spreads during a real estate bubble is the idea of avoiding to be left on the platform when the train leaves. In particular young people often think this way: If I don't invest in the housing market now, I cannot afford to buy a house when prices rise further.
Among many American homebuyers, even those with low incomes, the high price expectations and willingness to take on high debt in the form of expensive subprime mortgage loans were rooted in adaptive expectations about prices. Since prices had risen for a long time they would continue to rise. In a survey among San Francisco home buyers, conducted by Shiller and Case in 2005, when the market was booming, they found that the median expected price increase over the next ten years was 9 pct. a year and the mean expected price increase was 14
pct. a year. About a third of the respondents "reported truly extravagant expectationsoccasionally over 50 pct. a year." 53 The home buyers had observed substantial upwards price movements and heard other peoples' interpretations of these price increases, and not least the story that those price movements was sustainable in the long-run. Thus we can observe the contagion of unrealistic ideas about housing prices, mediated by a mouth-to-mouth feedback mechanism.
Another central aspect of the development of the recent US housing bubble was trust, also being an aspect of animal spirits. President Bush hardly mentioned the housing boom; in stead he boasted that mortgage rates were low. The then FED Governor, Alan Greenspan writes in his book published in 2007 that he didn't expect any bubble, but on the contrary "…lots of small local bubbles that never grew to a scale that could threaten the health of the overall economy." 54 Little more than a year later -after the bubble had collapsed and midst in a credit crisis -he admitted in an article in Financial Times that there had been both euphoria and "speculative fever." However, he claimed, the main problem is that our risk models and econometric models -no matter how complex they have become -still are "…too simple to capture the full array of governing variables that drive global economic reality." 55 According to
Greenspan it was only the limitations in the models' ability to manage complexity that prevented (mainstream) economists from understanding what actually happened during the housing bubble, 53 Shiller (2008: 45) 54 Greenspan (2007: 231) 55 Greenspan, Financial Times, 17. mars 2008 27 whilst he saw no problem when it came to theory and analytical approach. He also totally neglected research approaches from other disciplines like psychology, sociology, anthropology and history, just to name a few.
The then chairman of the Presidents Council of Economic Advisers, Ben Bernanke, pointed in a 2005-report out that house prices had risen 25 percent over the previous two years.
He stated that although this reflected speculation in "certain areas", it reflected on the national level "…strong economic fundamentals, including robust growth in jobs and incomes, low mortgage rates, steady rates of household formation, and factors that limit the expansion of housing supply in some areas." 56 House buyers relied on assurances from prominent monetary policy actors and renowned economists that the price movements in the housing market was sustainable and lasting and that risk by taking out high-risk mortgage loans was small. Money managers also believed that house prices would rise almost indefinitely and that the risk to invest "My thesis in this lecture is that macroeconomics in this original sense has succeeded: Its central problem of depression-prevention has been solved, for all practical purposes, and has in fact been solved for many decades." Within this market fundamentalist paradigm, the idea of the benefits of unfettered markets was deeply rooted. Even in the Central bank's own press-releases it was time and again claimed that the risk of recession had largely vanished, hence in the financial world one came to believe it was safe to search for yield despite a galloping housing bubble. Accordingly, there was a lack of reaction to asset-price inflation, and the will to prick bubbles was non-existent. The lax supervisory control tolerated excessive leverage ratios, the emergence of large and unregulated derivatives markets, and the development of an abnormal shadow banking system was likewise related to NEC and market fundamentalism.
III. The Norwegian banking crisis 1987-1992
It is well known that all the largest Nordic countries ( Østrup (2008) Loan losses 
Liberalization, growth and breakdown
After WW II, credit markets were heavily regulated. Interest rates were set administratively in order to keep the interest rate level low, thus giving incentives to investments. Quantitative credit restrictions were used to stabilize the financial markets, while at the same time credit flows were targeted to political prioritized sectors and projects. Regional policy was above all favored. At the end of the 1970s there were introduced tax regulations that provided strong incentives for investment in the stock market, which stimulated strong expansion. As revealed in chart A-3, the stock market prices were over 400 pct. higher in September 1987 compared to December 1980. Furthermore, the housing market was liberalized by Prime Minister Willoch's center-right government in 1983. Thus, there had been given strong incentives for investment in all asset markets. . 59 The liberalization process and the timing and sequence of de-regulatory measures led to a sharp increase in lending from Norwegian banks and even from other financial intermediaries. Over the period 1981 to 1988 the banks' outstanding loans increased 181 percent.
The sharp annual growth in bank lending during the run up to the crisis is further illustrated in chart A-2 in the Appendix.
Liberalization had an impact on both the demand-and the supply side of the economy, and contributed greatly to a strong expansion impulse in the economy, boosting the loan-funded investments in asset markets as well as the aforementioned growth in consumption. Norwegian households spent more than their income, and the huge consumption growth was largely financed with borrowed money. Another institutional factor that gave a strong incentive to accelerate credit growth during the early 1980s was the tax system that gave a strong incentive to borrow because it led to a negative real interest rate, particularly for the high-income groups.
Norway's fixed exchange rate regime was under pressure over the period 1977-84, and lost credibility because of several devaluations. Financial markets speculated heavily against the NOK, but Norges Bank protected the currency. However, the government wanted a steady nominal interest rate to maintain a stable currency in order to support the traditional Norwegian export industries. Hence, the central bank sterilized the sales of foreign exchange. This was done by increased lending to banks from zero to a level between 10 and 15% of the banks' funding.
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This increased the banks' funding with cheap money, and stimulated further the steep growth in bank lending.
When Norway experienced the sharp boom from 1983, the liberalization of the financial markets, linked with a pro cyclical expansive fiscal policy, brought about a speculative climate.
Easy credit and new rules of the game in the asset markets caused a sharp rise of real estate prices both regarding house prices as well as commercial properties. The real estate boom was clearly speculative as people were anticipating prices still going up, and the increased prices made room for further borrowing used for further investment in real estate as well as durable consumer goods. From 1984 a speculative, credit-driven price bubble built up in the real estate market, with a real rise in prices of well over 20 percent per year. Chart 5 depicts the development of housing prices as well as change in GDP over the same period. Whilst real GDP 59 The liberalization process is discussed in detail in Knutsen et al. (1998: 391 ff) and Knutsen (2007: 498 ff) 60 Gerderup (2003) 32 decreased from 1985 to 1988, housing prices increased sharply over the same period. The huge losses (table 1) and extensive defaults on loans and guarantees set off a major banking crisis in which the state had to rescue the largest banks. 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Chart 6 to 1993 concludes that "The deregulation that was carried out in many areas in the Norwegian economy from the middle of the 1980s is probably the single factor that made the strongest impact on the business cycle." 67 All these developments took place in a period characterized by a major structural shift in the Norwegian economy. The off-shore sector expanded, whilst traditional industries were crowded out. Beside the substantial influx of investments to the oil sector, the inland economy experienced considerable credit financed investments in durable consumption goods, services and in residential as well as non-residential real estate.
Liberalization and expansionary fiscal policy causing speculation and overconfidence about continuous rising prices in the asset markets were thus the main proximate causes of the banking crisis. But this process was facilitated by the longrun erosion of institutional stabilizers 65 Steigum (2004) 66 Cf. Johansen and Eika (2000) 67 Johansen and Eika, op.cit. (My translation from Norwegian.) that had taken place since the late 1970s, being the banking crisis's major causa remota. The overall macroeconomic climate that made room for the building up of financial imbalances to such a degree that it caused a systemic banking crisis was characterised by considerable economic-and regulatory structural shifts.
Management failure in banks that were hit by crisis ought also to be taken into consideration. Liberalization created a new situation as well as new rules of the game for bankers. The way they were used to run a bank was not compatible with increasingly competitive markets. Virtually unfettered competition in financial market unleashed a race among banks for market shares. In order to increase profit without reducing staff, which most bank managers considered difficult, their strategy was to increase lending. This was facilitated by the increased demand for credit. Thus the new strategy implemented by a majority of banks contributed to boost the credit volume significantly. The bank managements were not, however, aware of the rapidly increasing risk in their portfolios. Their old systems for assessing credit risk didn't work anymore under new and liberalized conditions and the result was loss of control.
When we compare the staggering 10 percent increase in private consumption during 1985
to the fact that the saving rate plummeted from 6 percent per year in 1984 to -4 percent in 1987
and that the growth rate of households' real disposable income fell from 3, 6 percent in 1984 to -0,6 percent in 1988, we understand that the growth in consumption mainly was financed by increased indebtedness.
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IV. Concluding comparison
The comparison of the analysis of the two cases are summed up in it is quite different in a Nordic country like Norway featuring a system of extensive welfare capitalism. The labour markets and the role of trade unions are also quite different.
Moreover, the financial systems show important differences. Whilst Norway historically has a bank-based system, the US-system has traditionally been more market oriented. Norway's banking system at the outset of the great financial crisis of the late 1980s was a system of Universal banks, combining retail banking, corporate finance and securities market business. By 1980, the banking system was dominated by three large commercial banks engaged in nationwide branch banking. However, there were still a large number of local and regional based savings banks left. There were even a number of local and regional commercial banks in operation, which consolidated to a fourth, relatively large banking group established in 1987 (Fokus Bank). The U.S. banking system is in contrast relatively more fragmented, and has not been built up according to the "Scottish model" with nation-wide branch banking. After 1980, however, the U.S. system changed substantially towards a system featuring universal, inter-state branch banking.
The context in which the two crises presented in this paper developed is both similar and different. They both occurred and unfolded in a phase of capitalist development characterized by deregulation of the financial system. Both crises also occurred in different societal situations than for example the social environment of the interwar financial crises. This of course gives each one of them unique traits, both regarding causes as well as consequences. Another important feature is the globalization process in addition to the tremendous deepening of financial markets over the last couple of decades. The recent American and subsequent global financial crisis have been taking place within an era of capitalist development characterised by a neo liberal and strongly market oriented order and accompanied by an ideology that can be labelled "market fundamentalism". In contrast, the Norwegian crisis of the late 1980s-early 1990s evolved during a period of transition to a similar type of capitalist order, away from a more interventionist and regulated capitalist order. It also necessary to emphasize that both crises developed within an increasingly financialized economy. Another very important development is the rise of China, particularly after 2000 to a much more prominent position in the global economy. Similar importance accrues to other Asian countries. In this context it should be emphasized that the USA in the inter-war years and during large parts of the post-war period was the world's largest capital exporter, whilst today it is the world's largest capital importer! Last, but not least, the digital revolution which has evolved since the 1980s has made a huge impact on society and economy, even with implications for financial stability.
Nevertheless the differences, our analysis of the two historical cases has also revealed a common pattern. One common feature of the two crises is that they occurred in periods of financialization -which means a condition where the financial sector to an increasingly extent dominates the production life of an economy. Capital mobility increased noticeably and Norway Similarly a boom-bust sequence even preceded the recent U.S. subprime and credit crisis. A commonality of both cases is that punctuation of asset market bubbles, which sparked dramatically falling asset prices, also preceded both crises.
In both cases the observed speculative upsurges and asset price inflations was fuelled by easy credit. The liquidity in the banking system increased considerably, among other things because of huge inflows of capital from abroad. In the U.S.-case, a strong incentive on the demand side for increased borrowing developed. The FED cut its key rate with 5,5 percentage points from [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] , and the inflation adjusted key rate was negative for 31 months, which stimulated steep price increases in the housing market and investments financed by borrowed money. However, there existed a widespread herd mentality with regard to investment strategy and which securities investments should be targeted towards. A similar market psychology was the basis for banks' credit decisions, underpinning speculation and overconfidence in lasting increasing asset prices.
The U.S. subprime and credit crisis was preceded by declining share of wages and salaries as percentage of GDP. Growing inequality made financial markets prone to instability.
Households and individuals had to struggle hard to find ways to maintain consumption and even consume more, which forced them into indebtedness. Even in the Norwegian case, savings turned negative and consumption was maintained and increased by accumulation of debt.
Another commonality of both cases is lax or non-existing regulations. This opened up for a considerable expansion of the financial system, including a growth of the securities market. Concomitantly, facing deregulated credit markets and subsequently excess competition in the banking sector, banks responded with a rush for increased market shares.
Bank lending to business investors and real estate investors boosted and debt mounted to unmanageable levels. A driving force underpinning this development was market psychology, and the result was speculation, ascending systemic risk and increased financial fragility. The ability to judge risk was distorted.
The American case shows a similar pattern. The evidence and analysis offered so far indicates that even the U.S. crisis was made possible of interplay between long-run structural changes in the real economy, particularly a descending share of wages as a percentage of GDP, and long-run changes in the institutional framework. Since the business cycle turned to an upswing late in 2001 until the current recession started in December 2007, in the wake of an evolving financial crisis, the development of the financial sector had been following a typical basic Minsky cycle. The financial system evolved from a relatively robust to a fragile structure.
Financial positions developed from "hedge" to "speculative" and "Ponzi", featuring more and more optimistic expectations about future returns. The thwarting institutions that had been stabilizing the financial sector through the consecutive business cycles since the Great Depression of the interwar years, had been gradually eroded, however, because of continuous liberalization since about 1980. Moreover, the New-Deal legislation primarily was constructed to regulate commercial banks, not investment banks. Consequently, a system of unregulated shadow-banking was allowed to expand unhampered. This long-run institutional change was increasingly conducive to instability. Within this framework, a housing bubble developed.
Dwindling investment opportunities in production of manufactured goods, to a great extent because of price competition from low-cost countries combined with sharply rising energy costs, channelled a growing flow of investments to the asset markets, particularly to the real estate market. The mortgage lenders identified the new profit opportunities by offering an increasing amount of subprime mortgage loans. The growing demand for houses increased the house prices, a price movement that was reinforced by further supply of subprime loans. This set off a housing boom which later on developed into a real estate bubble fed by easy credit, irrational optimism and overconfidence about future prices and future profits.
The bubble developed -like in the Norwegian case -within an increasingly financialized economy and generated excess demand for new financing instruments. Financial institutions searched for a technique to meet the high demand of mortgages by the way of securitization, and they started to buy up mortgages and credit card debt and then packed them and issued bonds and other securities based on these packages. Those who invested in those CDOs had only a vague understanding that the value of these securities was dependent on the monthly payment of mortgage borrowers and credit card holders, and it should also be kept in mind that unregulated financial entities played a major role in this business. Although securitization was not an option in the Norwegian case, new financial instruments and organizations even played a role in liberated markets during the 1980s.
The U.S. housing bubble was fuelled by credit from the banks, provided to borrowers that wanted to buy houses. Moreover, credit flowed to investment bankers which borrowed to 41 leverage investments in portfolios of CDOs and other credit derivates as well as CDSs. The rising housing prices made it possible for the home owners to refinance and take up new loans; which could be used to sustain or even increase consumption in spite of falling real income.
Consequently, debt as well as the banks' credit risk became more and more unmanageable.
The evidence presented by the analysis of the cases suggests that the fundamental causes of both crises are found in the boom and the asset market bubble(s) preceding the breakdown and the crisis. In both cases we can observe boom-bust cycles as depicted in a basic Minsky-cycle, where financial instability and the outbreak of crisis is a consequence of an unbalanced mix of hedge, speculative and Ponzi financial positions. In both cases we have observed a pattern where stabilising or thwarting institutions, as Minsky denoted them, were eroded. Hence, systemic risk was allowed to fill up the financial system, whilst the stabilizers were effectively removed. Each case demonstrates that structural processes interacting with major institutional changes effectively removed institutional stabilizers that were essential for building up financial imbalances of such a magnitude that the particular booms ended in systemic banking crises. 
